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ABSTRACT: The Rokkans’ theory of cleavages has traditionally been a valid helpful instrument, although 
questionable, to interpret the nexus between social dynamics and party models. Thanks also to this theo-
ry, during the hundred years between 1885 and 1985, European political party classification, at least 
where their origins are concerned, is reasonably straightforward. At the end of the sixties of ‘900, the per-
formance of the political actors in terms of policy stimulated a level of feedback on the social conditions of 
populations to the point of reducing the impact of the traditional cleavages. The thirty-year “Golden Age” 
steadily led the population to believe in a world where the affirmation of universalistic social rights was an 
acquired right regardless of offsetting economic measures. But in the following forty years, with this con-
viction still holding, the economic conditions for the sustainability of that model were overturned, and the 
prospect, therefore, of social benefits for all changed radically. Especially after the 2008 crisis, a new 
cleavage explodes with such an intensity that it actually squares the interests of the “protected” (state 
employees with steady jobs, workers of large and medium-sized firms protected by the Unions) with the 
“non-protected” (the unemployed, self-employed and seasonal labourers), in other words those of the 
established and non-established. In this framework, if they want to survive, the political parties both old 
and new, are continually being pressurised by an agitated electorate to realign themselves. And while in 
the short term gain votes populist and nationalist parties, the nature of the latest cleavage seems there-
fore to be a challenge especially for those parties which find themselves managing the “social blocs”, gen-
erated from the classic cleavages, and the identity nuclei. 
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1. The question 
 
The study of European political parties has often seen their origins interrelated with 
the historical dynamics of socio-economic and ideological-religious models together 
with polity. A particularly significant interpretative key on the subject has been Stein 
Rokkans’s theory of cleavages. 
The question raised here is in some way reversed compared to the direction which 
goes from society to politics: in our opinion in the last century, the performance of the 
political actors in terms of policy stimulated a level of feedback on the social conditions 
of populations to the point of reducing the impact of the traditional cleavages. 
The new cleavage, in our view, amounts to this: in Europe up till the 1970’s, a wide-
spread model of Welfare State model is implemented with universalistic trends and 
expectations; from the mid-1970’s this model enters a state of profound crisis thus 
consolidating the existing division between old insiders and new outsiders. 
Our premise is that the governing political forces between the end of the 20th cen-
tury and the beginning of the 21st have been profoundly conditioned by this latest 
cleavage in particular, and consequently have assumed considerably different identities 
from those of the past. 
 
 
2. The theoretical approach 
 
The theory of cleavages has traditionally been a valid helpful instrument, although 
questionable, to interpret the nexus between social dynamics and party models. 
Thanks also to this theory, during the hundred years between 1885 and 1985, Europe-
an political party classification, at least where their origins are concerned, is reasonably 
straightforward (Bartolini and Mayer 1990). 
In Rokkans’ classic formulation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Rokkan 1970, Rokkan 
1999), the two parallel processes of the Construction of the National State and the In-
dustrial Revolution produce four cleavages that give rise to the parties (nationalist, re-
gionalist, conservative, liberal, religious, socialist) which are to be found on the cutting-
line of the relative conflicts: a) conflict between those who support State centralization 
and those who defend socio-identity expectations (aspirations) of the provinces and 
the outskirts (centre vs. periphery); b) conflict between the affirmation of autonomy 
and supremacy of political power and the privileges of the historical status held by the 
Church (State vs. Church); c) conflict of interests between agrarian landowners and the 
emerging industrial middle classes (land vs. industry); d) conflict of owners and em-
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ployers with the class embracing tenants, seasonal labourers and workers (owner vs. 
worker). 
Rokkan’s theory opened the way to a wider methodological debate leading to preci-
sions and developments which are operatively significant. The first question has exam-
ined the need to define more clearly the nexus between cleavage and parties. Numer-
ous authors (Bartolini and Mayer 1990; Lawson, Römmele and Karasimeonov 1999; 
Bartolini 2000 e 2005, Deegan-Krause 2007) have pointed out how that nexus is really 
to be understood as the expression of “organized conflict”, resulting from three ele-
ments converging 1) the existence of a cross-cutting line according to class, religion, 
ethnic group, status or education; 2) the awareness of a collective identity by the social 
groups found on that cutting line and the transformation of their sense of belonging 
into commitment to mobilisation; 3) the conversion of that mobilisation into organisa-
tion terms through the driving forces of parties, unions and churches.  
From these factors a nonetheless important consequence is to be taken into consid-
eration: it is the nature of this or that cleavage which irrevocably conditions the main 
ideological–programmatic, organizational and consensual aspects of the parties that 
activate there. 
The second question has arisen around the dynamic/static problem of the same 
cleavages. Here, the debate has had to reckon with the mutation of the original condi-
tions of Rokkins’ cleavages; compared to the freezing proposition formulated by Lipset 
and Rokkan, dealignment and realignment are what are realistically spoken about, in-
dicating in dealignment the weakening of the old cutting lines and in realignment the 
gradual appearance of new ties between parties and social groups (Dalton, Flanagan 
and Beck 1984; Kriesi 1998; Manza and Brooks 1999; Martin 2000; Mayhew 2000; Kar-
vonen and Kuhnle 2001; Whitefield 2002; Zielinski 2002; Deegan-Krause 2007; Elff 
2007; Enyedi 2008). 
Two further interrogatives project us right into the present. They are: could not the 
inclination to override the original cleavages depend largely on the intentional action 
of the political subjects who have emerged and developed out of these same cleavag-
es, besides the changes caused by objective factors (technology, division of labour, 
markets etc.)? Can there also be new cleavages, different from those initially identified 
by Rokkan, and new political forces with characteristics that are ideologically, organiza-
tionally and consensually different from those of the old parties? 
These aspects have often been analysed, also for historical reasons, regardless of the 
reference to the cleavages theory. As a result there have been numerous written con-
tributions dedicated to the parties and their changes, concentrating in particular on 
their structure, functions and output, especially in the light of variables concerning 
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where they stand in respect to the political system (internal or external), the constitu-
tive criteria of institutional government (parliamentary, semi-presidential or presiden-
tial), the electoral system (proportional or majority), new means of communication 
(old and new media), the relationship between leader and followers, the personalisa-
tion of politics. 
Through these a sophisticated historical-typological classification has appeared, 
neatly summed up by the sequence “parties of notables/mass parties/catch-all par-
ties/cartel parties/personalized parties/ movement parties“ (see Segatori 2012 for fur-
ther details). Even one of the more up-to-date studies on the subject (Revelli 2013) has 
re-linked the present transformation of the political parties (from big and bureaucratic 
to slim and flexible) to a similar organisational type with the size and management 
changes in factories, firms and bureaucratic corporations. 
In our view, these descriptions, no doubt useful, could have acquired or could ac-
quire a sounder basis if associated with a renewed application of the cleavages theory. 
In the following pages we shall therefore continue along this route, drawing out the re-
lationship between some of the basic transformations of European society and the 
evolution of political party profile. In particular, we shall dedicate our attention to the 
last two interrogatives, that is to say: can the collective political actors compete to 
mend the original cleavages from where their movements arose? And therefore, is it 
possible to identify new cleavages that transversally cross the old ones? 
Outlining this research we are aware that: a) the emergence or appearance of the 
cleavages (those of Rokkan or others) did not, nor do always, come about in a synchro-
nized and/or similar way in the various European countries, and this fact contributes to 
explain the typological differences in time and space of the different party models; b) 
even if the four cleavages described by Rokkan have proved to be so and tend to reap-
pear autonomously as in the case of the centre/periphery conflict which generates the 
ethno-regional parties, in the Western Europe experience they have often gelled 
around the symbolic and practical meaning of the latest cleavage (the conflict between 
owner and worker), leading to the fundamental antithesis of right and left. 
 
 
3. The three classic macro variables 
 
The socio-political history of the last two and a half centuries is clearly characterized 
by three macro variables; however, in the last one hundred and thirty years a fourth 
one that has steadily appeared on the scene has drastically modified the relationship 
between European citizens and politics. We will develop this fourth variable further on, 
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to concentrate for the moment on the three original variables. They involve respective-
ly: a) the processes of polity with the definitive settling of nation states, at least up to 
the end of the 1980’s, compared to the centrifugal thrusts of the ‘small nations’ to-
wards autonomy and towards the nostalgic desire for the empire; b) the tenacious po-
litical repositioning of religious cultures after the affirmation of political secularisation; 
c) the socio-economic dynamics concerning types of production and use of wealth (ag-
riculture-industry, ground rent - industrial profit) and the consequences in terms of so-
cial conflict (productive bourgeoisie versus aristocratic landowners first, the proletariat 
versus middleclass capitalists, after. 
The first variable is divided into long historical transitional phases. Continental Eu-
rope and Oriental Europe were only able to consolidate internal borders with (except 
for spurts of conflict around and after 1989) World War I ending with the dissolution of 
the Hapsburg Empire, and World War II which led to the defeat of nazi-fascist hege-
monic aspirations. 
The strengthening of national States proceeds at the same rate as the trend towards 
the centralisation of political power. Those to come out disorientated, among others, 
are the inhabitants of the small nations who are to cause the underlying conflict that 
Rokkan links to the urban-periphery cleavage. We shall see further on how the above 
conflicting element reappears - particularly as a concurring reason – at every mention 
of the redefinition of territorial polity orientated at fixing new centres and new periph-
ery. The second macro variable is concerned with the birth and evolution of the con-
fessionary parties. The religious wars which cause so much bloodletting in Europe be-
tween the 1500’s and the 1700’s end (here also at different times non-conterminously 
in the various countries) with the principle of secularisation heralding victory. During 
the 1800’s, the Catholic Church in particular tries to check the liberal and anticlerical 
forces with organized associations of the masses in defence of professed religious be-
liefs and their own real social power. From here, the Christian parties gradually start 
budding (popular and Christian democrats) in countries like Belgium, the Low Coun-
tries, Austria, Germany and Italy. 
The third variable is the one which traces more incisively the relationship between 
the social political spheres. This is due to the fact that in this case the logic of material 
interests intersects with the logic of symbolic–cultural identity. The process is de-
scribed clearly by Karl Marx. From the second half of the 1700’s in England, and then 
during the 1800’s in the other continental countries (first in Central and Western Eu-
rope and then in Southern and Eastern Europe), the Industrial Revolution progresses at 
two different rates. Added to this are two further correlated processes, namely the 
great migrations (internal, but also between different States) and urbanisation. 
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It is common knowledge that these events convert into two great social conflicts 
which, in the more developed countries, tend to appear in succession. The first is be-
tween the rentiers and industrial manufacturers; the second, between capitalist indus-
trialists and the proletariat. The birth of the liberal State originates from the first con-
flict, where citizen civil rights (including freedom of speech and liberty of movement) 
are asserted primarily to guarantee the proto- industrialists the opportunity to detach 
agricultural labourers anchored in the land and move them as manpower to the facto-
ries in the urban centres. The second conflict creates the acutely strong-felt claims 
which lead to the founding of the Trade Unions and syndicates in general, as well as 
the organization of the socialist parties. 
It is well to remember that as regards the reconstruction outlined above, the situa-
tions present differentiated phases, not only in time and space, but also in the articula-
tion and combination of political aggregation models and parties. 
What happens is this: 
a) the rightwing and centre parties, as can easily be imagined, tend to identify them-
selves among the conservatives-landowners, liberal-free traders, interclass-faiths, 
without relinquishing the right to pursue, in particular historical times, lines of conver-
gence on positions of antisocialism and anticommunism; 
b) the leftwing parties find themselves wavering between extreme radicalism (espe-
cially when they take on the part of communist revolutionaries) and a progressive ori-
entation in the socialdemocratic sense. 
This is, therefore, the situation that Rokkan photographs at the end of the 1960’s 
and reaffirms in essays shortly afterwards. In the light of this, a long political and publi-
cist tradition, partly founded on the same factors taken into account by Rokkan and 
partly inspired by ideological-symbolic motives dating back to the French Revolution, 
fixes the central axis of the political arena in the right/left contraposition. The impact 
of this juxtaposition is such that this is where the majority of individuals, for the past 
two centuries at least, have identified themselves politically. 
 
 
4. The fourth macro variable 
 
The processes described in the preceding paragraph – the transformation of ways of 
production, internal migrations, shifting of the growing masses to urban centres, the 
intensive exploitation of factory labour – generate, primarily, particularly critical social 
conditions. The first problem for the growing working-classes is finding solutions for 
their own specific precarious and vulnerable conditions. In the face of this, the mutual 
Roberto Segatori, Thatcher’s Victims Vs Beveridge’s Sons. The new cleavage of European parties 
 
41 
 
aid societies develop in primis, followed by - as an inevitable self-defensive corollary – 
the trade unions and the labour and socialist parties. While on the political rights level 
universal suffrage gradually spreads (first for males only) between the mid-1800’s and 
mid-1900’s, and then during the last twenty years of the 1800’s the question of citi-
zens’ social rights explodes (accident safety protection, social assistance and health-
care, social security, education, housing) (Marshall, 1964; Zincone 1992).  
It is common knowledge that we owe the first systematic social policy programme to 
the German Chancellor Bismark, back in the 1880’s. In short, this is the starting point of 
a phase destined to evolve into the universalistic formula of the Welfare State. 
For the purposes of this article, the reconstruction of the three phases of growth of 
the WS that precede the crisis beginning towards the end of the 1900’s, the emphasis 
is not so much on the analytical details of the various policies amply considered (Briggs 
1961; Heclo 1974; Titmuss 1974; Wilensky 1975; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Flora and 
Heidenheimer 1981; Ferrera 1993; Girotti 1998), rather it is to draw out the fact that, 
through the contrasting attitudes of the right and left wing political forces adopting this 
model, a political culture instilled in the majority of European citizens seems to take for 
granted that overall state aid covering basic social needs is a basic right. 
The first season, which sees the introduction of political social assistance bodies, co-
vers the period from 1880 to 1920. It is a here where the Bismark model spreads 
throughout Europe. From a political aspect – only apparently paradoxical - it is the mo-
narchic-authoritarian regimes which first adopt such policies and only afterwards do 
the parliamentarian ones follow. On one side there is in fact the conservatives’ concern 
about the risks linked to the weakening of social cohesion, on the other, the intent to 
anticipate and control any likely mobilization of workers’ movements. It is not a coinci-
dence that Bismark combines the introduction of compulsory insurances between 1883 
and 1889 with norms aimed at limiting the rights to hold meetings and to demonstrate. 
In the span of four decades the “contributory model” of WS spreads from Germany and 
Austria to most of the European States: France, Luxemburg, Holland, and then, imme-
diately after the Great War, to Italy, Belgium and Great Britain. 
The second season coincides with the period between the two World Wars. The au-
thoritarian and totalitarian (headed by Fascism and Nazism) regimes consolidate this 
policy with the double intent of gaining further consensus and to keep the potentially 
fermenting revolutionaries under control. In the systems open to a wider social-
democratic leadership (Denmark and Sweden), from the twenties and thirties, means-
tested forms of universalistic welfare are experimented with. From a political point of 
view it is the socialist communist parties, even in liberal regimes, which are the most 
hesitant about what position to take. While in fact the Catholic trade unions and the 
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social democrat groups accept the line of gradual improvement in employment condi-
tions, the radical-left parties oppose the idea of being openly associated with the social 
integration strategy adopted by States they consider bourgeois so as not to forfeit the 
hypothesis of soviet style revolutionary change.  
The third season of the Welfare State (1945- 1975) is of the expansive type and is 
characterised by the so-called thirty year ‘Golden Age’. The improvement in economic 
conditions with the post war boom, the development of the construction and manufac-
turing industries (from cars to domestic appliances), the reorganization - Fordist-style - 
of large companies, the same State intervention in the economy, all bring about a level 
wealth that has an immediate effect on the welfare system. To bridge the gap between 
the previous period and this, the Beveridge plan of 1942 comes into operation in Great 
Britain, extending social security to all citizens independently of the contributions paid 
(according to a “universalist model” similar to the experience of WS Swedish), and 
which is improved on between 1946 and 1948 with the introduction of National Securi-
ty, aimed at assisting citizens “from the cradle to the grave”. 
These premises represent a boost in the reinforcing of the Welfare State throughout 
Europe. Since liberal echoes are not lacking, at least in the fifties and with America as 
an example, the models adopted remain basically two: the “universalistic” one, typical 
of the Scandinavian countries and Great Britain, and the “occupational” one, more 
widespread in continental Europe (the “residual” type model finds space particularly in 
the USA) (Titmuss 1974, Esping-Andersen 1990, Ferrera 1993). 
In spite of the differences between the two models (the former financed through 
means-testing with generalised fiscal coverage, the latter financed on a contribution 
basis with category coverage), up to the seventies the two models gradually converge 
leading the occupational one to adopt mixed forms. There are even countries, like Italy, 
that achieve this change of direction in the strategic sector of healthcare (with the in-
troduction in 1978 of the National health system), when, by now, the period of the 
thirty year ‘Golden Age’ is drawing to a close. The fact is that between 1965 and 1975 
the world is swept by an impetuous “season of movement” which, as well as using pro-
to-revolutionary idioms, the political agenda also lists demands for greater participa-
tion and especially more social rights. 
This third phase ends, in short, in the light of policy practices and, in particular, with 
convictions held by the majority of the population, that suggest a future characterised 
by the widespread growth of a “universalistic model” of Welfare State. 
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5. The break 
 
The double oil crisis of 1973 (with the Kippur war sparking off the Opec countries’ 
retaliation against the West) and 1979 (as the consequence of the Iranian revolution) 
triggers off a series of shock waves in the European economies. The sudden increase in 
oil prices hits, first and foremost, those States which depended on oil as their main 
source of energy, compelling them to adopt austerity measures by cutting public 
spending in tandem with the collapse of internal markets, the rise in unemployment 
and the growth of inflation at rates touching double digits due also to stock market 
speculation. The result is the onset of a period profoundly shaken by the sudden end to 
the GDP high growth rates which characterised the fifties and sixties.  
Apart from the economic austerity measures opted for, the political response to the 
economic crisis of the seventies follows two divergent courses: a) a brusque return to 
free trade, with Margaret Thatcher’s drastic remedy, (and Ronald Reagan’s in the Unit-
ed States); b) an attempt to survive on the standards of social policies attained (and 
therefore hold onto social consensus) through increased public borrowing. 
The former is the one followed in Great Britain when the Conservative Party leader, 
Margaret Thatcher occupies the Prime Minister’s chair from 1979 to 1990. Internally 
Thatcher implements a strict neoconservative policy with a far-reaching agenda that 
includes denationalization (privatisation of state-controlled companies), finance mar-
ket deregulation and the curtailing of  strikers’ rights which provokes head-on clashes 
with the miners and dockers. 
The paradox is that Great Britain, from where Lord Beveridge’s Universalistic Wel-
fare State blueprint spread worldwide, is the first country to take a step backwards in 
social policies, returning to a mixed system with private funding formulas. 
The latter, followed in those states with their particularly predominant tradition of 
catholic and social democratic parties, seeks to maintain a high level of social integra-
tion at the expence of economic equilibrium. This means that the Mediterranean coun-
tries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain), but also Ireland and Belgium, from the eight-
ies, begin to feel the side-effects of increased public expenditure which, in the follow-
ing decades, is unavoidably to be an increasingly heavy burden on the national econo-
mies (not least because of the interest charges due). 
One of the ways to counterbalance the twin drifting on both courses is to rely on the 
so-called Welfare Pluralism or Welfare mix. Rather than provide social services solely 
through the public sector, nearly all the European countries increasingly begin to invest 
in the Third Sector (voluntary associations, social cooperatives) (Powell 1987; Johnson 
1987; Ascoli 1987; Anheir and Seibel 1990). This practice – starting at the end of the 
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seventies and growing rapidly in the next three decades – achieves a two-fold ad-
vantage: substantially reducing the cost of healthcare provision and creating more flex-
ible methods of care.  
The phenomenon spreads throughout Europe: from the North (see Kuhnle and 
Selle1990 for Norway; Brenton 1985 for Great Britain), to the Centre (Seibel 1990 for 
France and West Germany), and to the South (Pasquinelli 1989 for Italy). It is clearly a 
compromise solution but at least it allows little used social resources to re-circulate. 
But when, to the economic disruption in the seventies, we add the financial difficul-
ties of the early nineties, the restrictions at the beginning of 2000 (binding the EU con-
senting countries to the strict regulations for entry in the eurozone) and in particular 
the effects of the dramatic financial crisis starting in 2008, the Welfare state model 
built up in the thirty-year “Golden Age” and kept alive by Welfare pluralism finally be-
gins to crumble. 
In the meantime, new social needs and new issues appear on the horizon. Firstly 
there is the ageing population and the shift in the demographic structure, due to the 
inverse ratio between young and old; then, the late eighties and early nineties see the 
uncontrolled surges of migratory waves from the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe. 
Both phenomena are ambivalent: extended life expectancy is a good illustration of the 
excellent level of proficiency reached by European care systems, yet at the same time 
the social security and social-healthcare sectors are progressively overburdened (Sega-
tori 1996). The arrival of immigrants compensates the low birthrate of indigenous pop-
ulations and supplies youth labour at low cost, but where this happens haphazardly 
and not budgeted for it opens up many problems of social integration. 
However, the real weakness lies on the employment front: technological progress in 
the more developed countries means less employment, and the social dumping of 
workers from deprived areas diverts manpower from countries where labour costs are 
higher. 
The practical consequences of high unemployment, particularly in Southern Europe-
an, coupled with an ageing population, mean lower tax revenues for the State (either 
direct or indirect), and additional costs for social policies (for employment, training, so-
cial benefits, housing, etc). 
For more than twenty years European countries have been involved in repeated leg-
islative attempts to rationalise and modernise the Welfare system. Priority issues are 
the costs incurred by social security and youth employment (but also the reinstate-
ment of workers laid off the production chains). At a faster pace in Central–Northern 
Europe and a slower one in the Southern countries, remedies have converged onto the 
return to deduction-based insurance schemes rather than the logic of universalistic 
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coverage based on tax revenue. As regards pension schemes, Italy for example, first 
passed from a tax-and-transfer system (where contributions paid are unrelated to pen-
sion received) to a direct contributory system (contributions and pension inter-
related); then the progressive raising of the retirement age inevitably followed (Jessou-
la 2009; Bonasia 2013). Moreover, if the introduction of such amendments has lesser 
consequences for the older labour sector, their application inevitably creates uncertain 
pension perspectives for those starting late to pay contributions (Assi 2013). 
Where employment policies are concerned there is an increasing tendency to favour 
forms of flexicurity as in Denmark, the other Scandinavian countries and Holland (An-
dersen and Svarer 2006; Phillips et al. 2007). In these cases, given a buoyant labour 
market, the young and unemployed exchange a minimum wage for medium-short- 
term periods to be available for in-training and re–training courses and flexible forms 
of employment. This formula, however, is thwarted by the unions in those countries 
with very high unemployment levels since they deeply mistrust the labour market’s ca-
pacity of assimilation, and they particularly fear that flexibility could mean only lifelong 
temporary employment (for the specific Italian case, for example, see Barton, Richiardi 
and Sacchi 2009). 
In socio-cultural terms, in the seventy years following the second World War the 
message passed on to Western European citizens altered after the first thirty years. 
The thirty-year “Golden Age” steadily led the population to believe in a world where 
the affirmation of universalistic social rights was an acquired right regardless of offset-
ting economic measures. In the following forty years, with this conviction still holding, 
the conditions for the sustainability of that model were overturned, and the prospect, 
therefore, of social benefits for all changed radically. 
This is reflected in a real difference of social security levels for following generations 
in the 1900’s. People born in the thirty years before the Second World War and in the 
twenty years immediately following could rely on ( and they still seem to be able to do 
so) good or reasonable healthcare and social assistance. Those born in the last forty 
years, especially in Southern Europe, are finding they are faced with inadequate (and 
perhaps nonexistent in the more backward regions) welfare and unemployment bene-
fits. 
A socio-psychological process similar to this, although in completely different histor-
ical, political and economic conditions, occurred to the populations of ex-socialist East-
ern European countries. Before 1989 the regimes under the Soviet Union were charac-
terised by the flouting of civil rights (with the precariousness of habeas corpus, the de-
nial of freedom of speech and liberty of movement, the absence of private property) 
and political rights (with elections neither free nor pluralistic), in exchange for a stand-
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ard of basic (nominal) democracy which guaranteed work and social assistance for all, 
albeit in terms of only a modest standard of living. 
The changes after 1989, which set into motion a confused phase of “democratic 
transition”, opened the floodgates to “wild” privatisation and deregulation manoeu-
vres (Eyal, Szelenyi,and Townsley 1998) leading to the curtailing, if not the loss, of even 
basic social benefits (work, pensions, social and health assistance) guaranteed by the 
preceding authoritarian and totalitarian regimes (Ringold 1999; Sotiropoulos, Neamtu 
and Stoyanova 2003).  
The result has seen, also in this case, a generational rift between the older one nos-
talgic for security benefits (modest but all-inclusive coverage) from a benevolent State, 
and the younger one on the continual lookout for new directions for self-fulfilment 
(Jeffries 2002; Barr 2005). 
 
 
6. The consequences of the new cleavage: the changes in the political forces 
 
After the 2008 crisis the new cleavage explodes with such an intensity that it actually 
squares the interests of the “protected” (state employees with steady jobs or perma-
nent contracts, workers of large and medium-sized firms protected by the Unions) with 
the “non-protected” (the unemployed,  
self-employed and seasonal labourers), in other words those of the established and 
non-established (Viviani 2009). Consequently, even towards the end of the last century 
politological literature began to point out that there was a changing shift in party lines 
(Franklin, Machie and Valen 1992; Katz and Mair 1994; Morlino 1998), although it 
seems the right/left axis still continues to dominate (Kutsen and Scarbrough 1995). 
However, it is clear by now that the traditional left and right parties, in order to keep 
their grip on the electorate, are obliged to undergo acrobatic manoeuvres, since their 
ideological baggage and the collateral associations of the past (the large employers and 
workers unions) can no longer interpret or represent the demands of the “non-
established”. The former conceptual distinction between conservatives and progres-
sives seem no longer to make sense.  
This double motion (socio-economic and political) is accelerated by a few significant 
intervening variables. On the social level the migratory waves from the south and East 
intensify, and coincide – provoking social alarm – with the industrial crises and an in-
crease in the number of indigenous unemployed especially in Southern Europe. On the 
political level, the parties try to neutralise the loss of militants and members by becom-
ing “cartel party” (Katz and Mair 1995), financed by the State. Among their executives, 
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however, the cases of corruption increase, becoming an almost endemic phenomenon 
especially Southern and Eastern Europe countries (see the annual Corruption Percep-
tion Index published by Transparency International). 
There are even more significant changes where political communication and the role 
played by the European Union after 1997 are concerned. The advent of commercial 
television and the way aggressive national leaders ( in this case the Italian tycoon Silvio 
Berlusconi) exploit television media lead, on the one hand, to a tendency to exaggerate 
the personalization of politics and, on the other, to conjecture the real possibility of it 
sliding towards a “spectators’ democracy” (Manin 1997). 
As for the EU, it has always been more preoccupied with the economic equilibrium 
of the member states than with the recognition of their rights to social equality. In par-
ticular, the Union takes the path towards economic-financial convergence in view of 
the changeover to the euro envisaged by a first treaty in 1997. The screw is tightened 
further with the Fiscal Stability Treaty (or Fiscal Compact) signed on 2nd March 2012 by 
all the member countries except Great Britain and the Czech Republic. One of the first 
results is that, for the countries with a high national debt and the continual risk of 
breaching the 3% deficit limit, the possibilities of increasing public expenditure in in-
vestments and social security coverage – typical Keynesian measures to cope with 
times of economic/occupational crisis - are drastically reduced. 
All together, therefore, the variables accumulating around the cleavage between es-
tablished and non-established, rather than helping mend it, appear to be doing the op-
posite. Among the younger population and outsiders in particular, there is a growing 
sense of aversion towards the existing political situation. Such aversions are emotive 
before they are rational, and gel around three nuclei: a) the search for an enemy or 
scapegoat in the face of increasing hardship; b) the need for reassurance about prob-
lem resolving; c) the search for a leader who seems to have the right answers, capable 
of making rapid decisions (Segatori 2010). 
In this framework, if they want to survive, the political parties both old and new, are 
continually being pressurised by an agitated electorate to realign themselves. What is 
necessary from a politological point of view is to review a few of the practices em-
blematic of the two supposedly dominating political currents - (centre)-right and (cen-
tre)-left - and emerging or re-emerging movements identifiable with neither, projecting 
all to the 2014 European elections and trying to be alert to the signals of change. 
One of the first emerging aspects concerns the extreme personalization of politics, 
which is not only a result of the new forms of mass media communication, but also the 
reflection of how much the electorate need to identify with leaders who are able to 
choose the path best suited to the new season. 
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The European centre-right of the last twenty years may be summed up by the fol-
lowing figures: Silvio Berlusconi (Forza Italia, four times Italian prime minister since 
1994), Angela Merkel (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU, German 
chancellor from 2005) and Nicolas Sarkozy (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire, 
UMP, President of the French Republic from 2007 to 2012). All their official agendas 
hold elements common to the conservative tradition: free trade inspiration, market de-
regulation, reduced unemployment benefits, high priority to law and order (especially 
in Sarkozy’s), income tax reduction schemes (especially for higher incomes, as in the 
case of Berlusconi, and in the case of the flat tax in Merkel’s). These policies are simul-
taneously mitigated by opposing measures, accentuated by bouts of populism in Ber-
lusconi (warnings against the alleged communist threat) and Sarkozy’s defence of na-
tional corporates considered to be strategic in the face of heavy financial losses, in-
vestments in strategic public works, promises of millions of additional jobs, transfer of 
European funds from their original destinations to gain the consent of categories 
strongly influenced by the unions, etc. (see, for a profile of the three leaders, Ignazi 
2014; Kornelius 2013; Baldini e Lazar 2007). 
This mainstream enabled the European People's Party to gain a majority in the 2014 
European elections with 29.43% votes and 221 out of 751 MEP’s, plus an additional 
9.32% votes and 67 ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) euro deputies, as 
well as the percentages and deputies elected from smaller groups (for these data and 
those that follow, see: www.europar.europa.eu; for Italian data the source is Ministry 
of the Internal affairs). 
However, this slant wasn’t deemed sufficient enough to reassure the extreme right 
political forces electorate (Hainsworth 2000, Carter 2005). Out of this galaxy the parties 
in fact re-emerged as Le Pen’s National Front in France (in the 2014 European elections 
Marine Le Pen gains 26% of the French vote), in Britain Nigel Farage’s UK Independ-
ence Party (UKIP) which, with more than 30% of votes in the European elections, over-
took David Cameron’s Conservative Party, Heinz-Christian Strache’s Freiheitlichen 
Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) in Austria (20.1%), Laikos Syndesmos-Chrysi Avgi (Chrysi Avgi) 
in Greece (9.3%), not to mention the German neo-Nazis of Nationaldemokratische 
Partei Deutschlands (NPD), which won one seat, entering Strasbourg for the first time. 
At the last European elections these parties re-adopted, with a fair amount of success 
in the first three cases, key slogans typical of the populist, nationalist, xenophobic and 
eurosceptic right: "no immigrants", "no euro", protectionism in economic affairs. 
Albeit with their own characteristics, resulting from their different historical back-
grounds, connotations of nationalism, populism and (at times) Euroscepticism are also 
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to be found in the major parties of post-communist Eastern European countries like Po-
land and Hungary (Pisciotta 2007). 
The evolution of the centre-left parties is to a certain extent parallel to the centre-
right forces. Here too, we can identify with three personalities who embody radical 
transformation: Tony Blair (New Labour, British Prime Minister from 1997 to 2007), Jo-
sé Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE, President of the 
Spanish Government from 2004 to 2011) and Matteo Renzi (Partito Democratico, PD, 
President of the Italian Council of Ministers from 22nd February 2014, after winning 
the party leadership elections on December 8th, 2013). 
Except for a few differences over civil rights and anti-clericalism where Zapatero’s 
fighting spirit makes him stand out from the other two leaders, economic and social 
policies tend to be the same, following the pattern initially set out by Tony Blair. His 
new agenda is inspired by the "Third Way" concept, theorised by Anthony Giddens as 
the middle road between Thatcherite free trade and traditional left state intervention 
(1994, 1998, 2000). In practice it means the old socialist ideas of huge state subsidies in 
the productive and services sectors are abandoned, the same privatisation measures 
adopted by previous centre-right governments continue (also for cash-flow reasons), 
there are attempts to re-launch employment through reforms that, in the presence of 
difficult economic situations, tend towards greater labour flexibility. Many of these 
choices are made with a clean break from the old powerful trade unions links. To coun-
terbalance these “liberal” type policies new ways are tried to safeguard the more vul-
nerable, especially the young, with various incentives for training, apprenticeships/jobs 
and housing facilities; systematic ways to combat tax evasion is seen as a priority; axing 
political spending and public expenditure (the cost of public employees) are desirable 
targets. Figuratively speaking, Matteo Renzi makes his debut on the national stage with 
his party banner slogan “the old political class on the scrap-heap", along the lines of 
what Tony Blair did to Old Labour (see, for the three leaders, Faucher-King, Le Galès 
and Elliott 2010; Field 2011; Lavia, Mauro, De Angelis e Colombo 2014). 
In the 2014 European elections, due mainly to the PD’s success with Matteo Renzi 
obtaining 40.8% of votes in Italy, the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and 
Democrats gains an overall 29.43% votes and sees 191 MEPs elected. 
Even here, as in the centre right’s case, the evolution of the major democratic left 
parties are tormented with lacerations and landslides towards the radical left, whose 
election results generally fluctuate inversely with those of the moderate left (March 
and Mudde 2005; Hudson 2012). If only to highlight examples of recent decades, com-
pared to the PSOE, the PS, the SPD and the PD, in Spain the radical Left finds itself in 
the Izquierda Unida group, in the Front de Gauche in France, in Germany in Die Linke, 
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in Italy in Rifondazione and SEL (Ramiro and Verge 2013; Brie and Hindelbrandt 2005; 
Damiani 2011). Again with reference to the European elections, the transnational list 
headed by Alexis Tsipras, leader of SYRIZA (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou 2013), obtains in 
Greece 26.4% votes, and Podemos, the party formed on January 17 2014 out of the the 
indignados movement reaches 8% votes in Spain. 
In general it concerns movements, rather than eurosceptic political groups protest-
ing against "bankers’ Europe" claiming wider social rights, free access to the common 
good (from water to soft technology innovations), a more equitable redistribution of 
wealth and general employment subsidies. 
As well as the two currents examined above, the political spectrum is coloured by 
three other actors not immediately identifiable with ‘right/left’. We are referring to the 
Green movement, the ethno regionalist parties and populist parties in general. 
The Greens were among the first in Europe to champion environmental issues 
(Bomber 1998). Having battled for years against the exploitation of natural resources, 
as well as campaigning for nature preservation and sustainable energy, they arrive di-
vided at the 2014 European elections and find themselves together with other allied 
parties in two different European Parliament groups: GUE/NGL (European United 
Left/Nordic Green Left) with 6.92% votes and 50 MEPs, and Greens/ ALE 
(Greens/European Free Alliance) with 6.66% and 48 MEPs. 
The ethno-regionalist parties, in their turn, come from a long tradition of clashes 
with their respective national states (De Winter and Türsan 1998). Filippo Tronconi 
(2009), who examines 24 cases for 17 European regions, makes the distinction be-
tween parties "guardians" of ethnic identity and the "challenging" parties of the exist-
ing party-political system. The tightening hold of the European Union, which even con-
ditions the internal regulations of member countries, becomes for many of them the 
new arena to fight out battles for self-assertion, individual rights, their own identity 
and autonomy (Di Sotto 2009). On this front, there is no shortage of parties claiming to 
be ethno-regionalist although somewhat dubiously or with "false foundation", like the 
Italian Lega Nord (Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro 2002). The fact remains that by exploiting 
basic Euroscepticism especially against the euro, and xenophobic bouts, it is precisely 
the Lega Nord, that after a period of decline, saw its consensus grow in the 2014 Euro-
pean elections gaining in Italy 6,16 % votes and sending an unexpected 5 deputies to 
Euro parliament. 
Finally there is the phenomenon of the return of populism. The term, of course, re-
fers to the action of those leaders who appeal directly to the "people" (especially to 
those who feel "displaced" by the prevalent socio-economic situations) proposing 
themselves as alternatives to the professional politicians, economic lobbyists and the 
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so-called "different" (Mény e Surel 2001). Populist can describe either a style of leader-
ship - as we have seen in both the right and left parties - or a movement with ambiva-
lent traits. The most recent and striking example of the latter is Beppe Grillo’s Italian 
“Movimento 5 Stelle” (‘5 Star Movement’) (Corbetta e Gualmini 2013). Set up with the 
intention of pursuing objectives like preservation and water nationalization, environ-
ment, transport, and energy development (“Carta di Firenze” 2009), as well as combat-
ting the political classes with criminal records, the Movimento 5 Stelle peaked in the 
2013 Italian general election with 25,56% votes in the House, gaining 108 deputies and 
54 senators. On this occasion Beppe Grillo gained consensus especially from among the 
unemployed, the self-employed, workers and students, drawing them mainly from the 
Partito Democratico and the Popolo della Libertà (Osservatorio elettorale LaPolis 
2013). 
In the 2014 European elections, while not achieving the same results as in the gen-
eral election, the Movimento 5 Stelle gained in Italy 21,16% votes, sending 17 MEPs to 
Strasbourg. 
 
 
7. Understanding the transformations 
 
Assessing the performance of the contending political forces in the results of the 
2014 European elections two things seem to be evident: a) the popularity of the major 
centre-right and centre-left parties is confirmed, but with a significant drop in voter 
support; b) the populist, radical (both right and left) and ethno-regionalist groups see 
an increase in votes obtained but fail to reach the force of the principal agglomera-
tions. Put this way, nearly all the parties have failed to provided the right answers for 
all: some good at taking on particular petitions, but all incapable of representing large 
cohesive electorate blocs. To interpret this situation it is appropriate therefore to re-
turn to the theoretical study of political parties. What is it, ultimately, that defines a 
political force? What are the fundamental issues that allow it to achieve consensus? 
The answer lies in where a party stands in relation to three nuclei: emotive, identity, 
programmatic. 
The emotive nucleus corresponds to the mobilisation of motivation and can act ei-
ther positively (for someone) or negatively (against someone). In times of crisis it capi-
talises on the unrest of the discontented and is apt to be pre-empted by the new arri-
vals who, at least initially, raise expectations for something new or at least different. 
The identity nucleus concerns the existence of areas of solidarity, similar to, on an 
objective level, the concept of social blocs based on common interests, and on the sub-
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jective level, a strong sense of belonging sustained by conscience and shared values. 
The identity nucleus is the pivot on which party stability and their fate hinge. The clas-
sic identity nuclei are primarily those with their origin in the cleavages described by 
Rokkan. 
Lastly the programmatic nucleus represents the translation of the other two nuclei 
thrusts into coherent policy programmes. 
In the light of this, what is clearly evident is the disruptive effect produced on the 
traditional social blocs and the old solidarity areas of the socio-economic dynamics de-
scribed above. As we have seen, since the eighties of the last century the economic and 
productive world scenario has changed radically. Financial speculative capitalism has 
overridden the pursuit of mere industrial profit; electronic soft technology has over-
taken hard technology and the Fordist employment models of the traditional sectors; 
mass production can now be achieved with less manpower; "society of producers" has 
given way to a "consumer society" (Baudrillard 1970), if not a "society of mass borrow-
ers"; populations world-wide are increasingly mobile, driven by needs induced also by 
the global media.  
However, a new cultural paradigm, regarding possible forms of wealth redistribution 
and social protection differing from “free market mainstream”, has not associated it-
self with these phenomena The expectations, first, and then the crisis of the universal-
istic model of welfare state have therefore increased indigenous uneasiness within Eu-
ropean countries; parallel with this is the increasing fragility of the less organized na-
tions, from the central and semi-suburban areas defined in Wallerstein’s classic distinc-
tion between central States, the peripheral and semi-peripheral.  
The impact of the latest cleavage between insiders and outsiders with respect to the 
new economic order has turned out to be highly disruptive on the three constitutive 
nuclei of the European political parties. The populist movements are the ones to have 
profited most from the protest throbs which concern the emotive nucleus. But the rel-
ative indecision and the ambiguous aspects of the other two nuclei (identity and pro-
grammatic) seem to have commended them to a fate of momentary success and grad-
ual eclipse in the future. 
The ethno-regionalist and extreme right parties, besides profiting from the emotive 
nucleus anti-European thrusts, have pursued the identity nucleus reconstruction by re-
turning to the past, that is to say, to community type self-defensive closed attitudes 
(nationalism and autonomy of the small countries), particularly hostile towards the 
"different". Their success in the 2014 elections, over and above possible future surges 
of consensus, suggests that they have a significant, although not generalized, power of 
attraction.  
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The new cleavage has particularly affected the major centre-right and centre-left ag-
glomerations. The identity nucleus of the former saw the defection of the indigenous 
middle classes, traditionally belonging to the moderate area, with a change for the 
worse in their conditions and status. The centre-left parties have also suffered a similar 
fate since the high increase in redundancy and unemployment has destabilised the so-
cial bloc on which the old Left built their identity. 
The radical-left groups have reacted by looking for a solution in the re-composition - 
emotive and identity together - of the old proletarian so-called anti-capitalist solidarity. 
But the electorate’s response proved tepid to a proposal that seemed to be inspired by 
past historical seasons, when Marxism had solid grounds to claim success based on the 
theory that the proletariat had more credit to its name than the other classes (Segatori 
1997). 
The nature of the latest cleavage seems therefore to be a challenge especially for 
those parties which find themselves managing the “social blocs”, generated from the 
classic cleavages, and the relative identity nuclei. The current earthquake has forced 
them to act on the programmatic nucleus (made up of incisive policies) to respond 
primarily to the needs of the young, the unemployed and the impoverished or shrink-
ing middle classes, to put together the pieces recomposed from the social blocs of the 
old order.  
We have seen that this is a very complex undertaking where economic and social 
policy remedies of do not appear to ease the short term social conflict. What happens 
in the second decade of the XXI century will affect how this process evolves. 
The panorama we see is contradictory. The centre-right parties try to recover lost 
loyalties by aiming to protect capital stratifications, reduce income tax rates, develop 
free trade. The social democratic parties, in order to bond where possible old and new 
forms of solidarity, are trying to introduce politically (and with uncertain time sched-
ules) a cultural alternative to the “free market ideology” to champion employment for 
the young, the fragile categories and all those who risk losing, with unemployment, 
their dignity.  
However the real problem is that, in contrast to the historical social cleavages, 
where almost immediately either a pars destruens or a pars costruens surfaced, the 
characteristic of the latest cleavage is an area of conflict immediately emerging, 
whereas an eventual re-composition of the existing social imbalances is unforeseeable 
in the near future 
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